Fees and terms
There is no management fee and no performance fee. That is not a marketing claim — it is a structural fact, and it has a consequence worth understanding before it sounds like a benefit.
The protocol is not paid by you. It is paid by the spread. It borrows the facility's coupon and pays out a lower pass-through, and the difference is its revenue. So the number that matters to a holder is not a fee schedule; it is the gap between what the facility yields and what reaches NAV.
The waterfall, from facility coupon to your NAV
At the participation-feasible optimum, on the model's calibrated coordinates. All figures are basis points of reserve, per period.
| Step | bps | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Facility coupon received | 1,000 | modelled at the optimum |
| less monitoring | 25 | modelled charge |
| less insurance premium | 5 | unverified — the deck does not disclose a premium |
| less reinsurance charge | 10 | unverified |
| less hedging | 40 | unverified |
| less market-maker retainer | 0 | unverified, held at zero rather than invented |
| less issuance-layer fee | 0 | unverified, same |
| = gross available | 920 | |
| less pass-through to sdrUSD holders | 450 | the holder's outside option |
| less protocol operating cost base | 400 | deck-sourced, itemised below |
| = protocol residual | 404 | participation_frontier |
Two readings matter.
The protocol's take is 404 bps at a 12% borrower alternative — and the deck's steady-state plan is 450, which needs 12.62%. That gap is the subject of how Doré makes money, and it is the single most consequential number on this site for anyone modelling the business.
Four of the seven deductions are unverified. They are carried at declared values rather than omitted, so the arithmetic is complete and the uncertainty is visible. If the insurance premium is materially above 5 bps — and no source states it — the residual moves one-for-one.
The operating cost base
The 400 bps above is not an abstraction. The deck itemises year one:
| Layer | Provision | Year one |
|---|---|---|
| ADGM SPV | ring-fenced issuer, registration, registered office, corporate services | $10–15k |
| FSRA authorisation | Category 3C or sub-threshold manager, incl. $50k locked regulatory capital | $120–160k |
| Counsel | token and securities opinions across UAE, EU and US; offering documents; facility enforcement | $220–280k |
| Audit and attestation | two smart-contract audits, monthly reserve attestation, statutory audit, fund administration | $180–260k |
| Monitoring | real-time threat detection, MPC custody, bug bounty | $90–130k |
Roughly $620–845k, against which the deck states that $50m of reserve covers the cost base. Below that scale the protocol is loss-making by construction; above it the margin scales without the facilities, the origination work or the headcount changing.
That last claim — that the same team runs $1bn as runs $100m — is a judgment, not a proof, and this documentation does not model it.
What a holder actually pays
| Charge | Amount |
|---|---|
| Subscription fee | none |
| Management fee | none |
| Performance fee | none |
| Redemption fee | none |
| Exit at par via the queue | free, subject to the 30-day cycle |
| Exit via the secondary pool | whatever the market takes — this is the real cost of early exit |
The absence of a fee schedule is genuine, and it is also the point at which a reader should be most careful. A holder pays nothing explicit and bears everything structural: the pass-through is set by the issuer rather than negotiated, it steps down as the reserve grows, and there is currently no governance mechanism constraining that change — see governance.
Terms
| Term | drUSD | sdrUSD |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum subscription | none in the contract | none in the contract; a fund route would require one |
| Yield | none | accrues to NAV |
| Primary redemption | at par, on demand, no queue | 30-day queue matched to the facility cycle |
| Redemption pricing | par | priced at request time |
| Secondary exit | not applicable | pool, at market |
| Loss absorption | none | ahead of the protocol |
| Transfer | ERC-20 today; whitelisting and eligible-venue treatment not yet designed | same |
Request-time pricing cuts both ways, and the docs previously stated only the favourable half. It protects the redeemer from a later loss — and it therefore concentrates that loss on the holders who remain. That is a run incentive: in deteriorating conditions, queuing early is strictly better than queuing late. No anti-dilution levy or queue gate currently offsets it.
Reporting
| Report | Cadence | Status |
|---|---|---|
| On-chain reserve state | continuous | implemented |
| Settlement receipts | per settlement, append-only | implemented |
| Independent reserve attestation | monthly, incl. a random-day test | required by COBS 19A.9.1(b)(iv); no attestor engaged |
| Reserve audit | annual | required by 19A.10; no auditor engaged |
| Real deployed capital vs TVL | — | committed to on /simulation; no reporting exists yet |
Three of the five are commitments rather than operating processes. That is the honest state, and it is the same list that appears in risks.